

Secret

25X1

25X1

NSA review completed



Twenty-Second Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

(This report covers the period from
17 July through 23 July 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

Secret

23

25X1

24 July 1973

DIA review(s)
completed.

Page Denied

24 July 1973

Twenty-Second Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*

(This report covers the period from
17 July through 23 July 1973)

The Key Points

- A small number of civilian and military specialists were the only new North Vietnamese personnel detected beginning the infiltration trip to the south during the week.
- North Vietnamese logistic activity continued at a high pace in northern South Vietnam, but was at low or moderate rainy season levels elsewhere.
- Combat activity was at low levels in both South Vietnam and Laos.
- A comprehensive assessment of our evidence shows that Communist military personnel in South Vietnam--both combat and administrative services personnel--have increased from 221,000 on 27 January to 268,000 at present. The size of North Vietnamese forces in southern Laos and Cambodia has diminished in the same period as substantial numbers have crossed over into South Vietnam.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

The Details

NOTE: This is the twenty-second in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

25X1

I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments

1. No new combat infiltration groups were detected starting the trip south from North Vietnam during the past week. A re-evaluation of earlier evidence, however, indicates that four combat infiltration groups rather than the three originally reported left North Vietnam during the previous week (11-17 July). This ^{additional} group may have the normal complement of 500 men, but we have as yet actually observed only 55 men in the group. In the current week (17-23 July), only three smaller groups of civil and military specialists, totalling about 75 people, were actually detected entering the infiltration pipeline.

2. The new detections, plus the acceptance of the additional combat group for the previous week, raises the total number of North Vietnamese personnel who have begun the infiltration trip to the south

25X1

since the 15 June "second" ceasefire to about 3,500. Some 3,000 of these have been combat troops, and the remainder have been specialists. Since the original 27 January ceasefire, more than 54,000 North Vietnamese personnel have infiltrated into South Vietnam, Cambodia, and southern Laos. More than 29,000 of these began the infiltration trip after 27 January, while the other 25,000 were already in the pipeline as of that date. (ANNEX B, [redacted] contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to infiltration received during the week.)

25X1

3. Newly received evidence indicates that the headquarters of the 58th Artillery Regiment of the NVA 308th Division is now located in the Hanoi area. The unit, along with the rest of the division, fought in Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam during the 1972 Communist offensive. Since the headquarters of the division and its three infantry regiments returned to North Vietnam during January and February of this year, as previously reported, the artillery regiment probably also returned to the North during the same period. The departure of this unit has not appreciably reduced North Vietnamese firepower in the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, where Hanoi still maintains 6 artillery regiments.

4. Elements of COSVN Headquarters continue to move into South Vietnam from Cambodia. On 10 July, an additional subordinate element of COSVN was observed in South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province, having moved from its early May position in Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia. This redeployment, following a similar move by another element in early June (see the 12 June 1973 weekly violations report), suggests that still another command unit of COSVN probably will relocate from Cambodia to South Vietnam, as all three units normally operate in the same geographic area.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
North Vietnam

5. NVA resupply movements in southern North Vietnam continued at a moderate level during the

25X1

[redacted]

reporting period. Logistic activity was again centered on Vinh and in the area from Quang Khe south to the DMZ. On 12 July, 17 cargo vehicles were detected moving between two storage facilities west of Vinh. On the same day, another NVA logistic unit received 66 tons of ordnance (much of which was reportedly damaged), and was scheduled to receive 250 tons of cargo during 17-31 July. According to one reliable report received during the week, the major POL shipping agency in Thanh Hoa Province of North Vietnam was to ship some 325 tons of POL products to unspecified NVA units in the near future.


6. In the area just to the north of the DMZ, 20 southbound and 32 northbound cargo vehicles were observed crossing the Troc River southwest of Quang Khe on 12 July. On 16 July, 23 northbound and 27 southbound vehicles were observed at the same location. On 18 and 19 July, a major logistic unit south of Quang Khe received over 110 tons of rocket and mortar ammunition from another NVA supply unit west of Vinh.

Southern Laos/Cambodia

7. With the rainy season continuing, there is still little evidence of supply activity in southern Laos. The Communists are, however, continuing their construction work aimed at upgrading the supply corridor in the Panhandle. [redacted] construction activity was observed on Routes 91 and 911 in the Tchepone area. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers mentioned in this report.) Farther south, in the tri-border area of Laos and northeastern Cambodia, there have been persistent reports of supplies being moved by boat, a mode of transport traditionally used by NVA units in that area during the rainy season. On 13 July, three watercraft were observed transporting nearly 20 tons of rice northward through the tri-border area. The shipment was destined for an NVA unit operating on the Communists' western supply corridor in GVN MR 1. Another NVA unit operating in northeastern Cambodia was observed transporting some 10 tons of rice by boat on 15 July to an undesignated location.

25X1

25X1



[REDACTED]

South Vietnam

8. The heaviest current levels of North Vietnamese logistic activity in Indochina are still being observed along the Communists' western supply corridor in northern and western South Vietnam. Reports from units operating on the western corridor showed the following activity. On 15 July, a storage and transshipment facility along Route 548 received 62 cargo vehicles with 185 tons of rice and foodstuffs. On 17 July, the same unit received 43 vehicles carrying nearly 180 tons of rice and gasoline. On 14 July, another logistic unit operating along the route reportedly had almost 6,000 tons of supplies remaining on hand.

25X1 9. In addition to this activity on the western corridor, fairly heavy NVA traffic movements were detected on other routes in northern South Vietnam. [REDACTED] 74 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 6089 south of Khe Sanh, and on 19 July 116 cargo trucks were seen on Route 9 between Dong Ha and the Laos/South Vietnam border. An NVA supply unit operating in the Cua Viet River area of eastern Quang Tri Province was observed processing 167 cargo vehicles through a river crossing point in its area on 18 July, and on 20 July, 120 vehicles were seen traveling through the unit's area of responsibility.

25X1 10. Farther south, the Communists are continuing to build up areas along their new western supply corridor. On Route 614 south of the A Shau Valley, twelve newly constructed or enlarged areas containing a total of nearly 150 buildings were observed [REDACTED] 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] One of the groups of buildings was surrounded by small cultivated plots. In a possibly related development, a reliable report received during the week indicates that nearly 800 tons of nitrogen fertilizer were being sent from Hanoi to Quang Tri Province. Some 100 tons of the shipment had been received at Dong Ha on 3 July, and the remainder was to arrive over an unspecified period.

25X1

II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

A. South Vietnam

11. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (17-23 July) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since 27 January "Ceasefire"</u>		<u>Total Since 15 June "Ceasefire"</u>		<u>Last Week (17-23 Jul)</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,085	3,660	60	301	11	54
MR 2	339	2,397	75	543	10	97
MR 3	459	3,099	57	523	17	126
MR 4	779	7,265	101	1,099	16	175
Totals	2,662	16,421	293	2,466	54 (47)	452 (400) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

12. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

B. Laos


13. Combat activity in Laos was at a low level during the week with no significant Communist ceasefire violations reported.

25X1



CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

A. Changes Between 27 January and the Present in the Communist Force Structure in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia

14. Since the 27 January settlement agreement went into effect, the total number of VC/NVA combat and administrative services troops in South Vietnam has increased by some 47,000 men (see the table below).

CIA/DIA Order of Battle of Communist Military Forces in South Vietnam, 1973
(in thousands)

	"First" Ceasefire	"Second" Ceasefire	The Present
	<u>27 Jan</u>	<u>15 Jun^a/</u>	<u>10 Jul</u>
Regular Combat Forces	<u>149</u>	<u>167</u>	<u>172</u>
NVA	124	140	145
VC	25	27	27
Administrative Services	<u>72</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>96</u>
NVA	35	37	53
VC	37	43	43
Total	<u>221</u>	<u>247</u>	<u>268</u>
NVA	159	177	198
VC	62	70	70

a/ The agreed CIA/DIA listing for May 1973 was used for 15 June. By late May, however, it became clear that large numbers of NVA administrative services units were in the process of relocating from southern Laos and northwestern Cambodia to western South Vietnam. Until the full extent of this major shift could be determined, CIA/DIA decided not to publish any new interim order of battle. By 10 July, the Intelligence Community was able to estimate that some 16,000 North Vietnamese administrative services personnel, plus another 5,000 combat troops, had relocated into South Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia since the spring of 1973.

15. The total increase of Communist personnel in South Vietnam from 221,000 to 268,000 between 27 January and the present includes VC and NVA combat and administrative services units which deployed into the country after 27 January, and those North Vietnamese replacement personnel who arrived since that date in infiltration groups to augment the strength of existing in-country units. Nearly 85 percent of the increase--or 39,000 men--were North Vietnamese troops, and the remaining 8,000 were Viet Cong. (These figures do not correlate with our infiltration estimates because of casualties, attrition, and other factors.) Most of the 39,000 new North Vietnamese troops entered South Vietnam since March, and their arrival reflects the shift of NVA forces from southern Laos and Cambodia into western South Vietnam. As a result of all the changes of the past half year, we estimate that North Vietnamese troops provide nearly 75 percent of the total Communist regular forces now in South Vietnam. The map on the next page shows the distribution of Communist, as well as South Vietnamese, combat personnel by Military Region. Administrative service forces are not included on the map.

16. The unprecedented movement of North Vietnamese administrative service units into South Vietnam (over half of the total increase since 27 January) is in support of the new western supply corridor. When completed, this will be a primary, all-season route running from the DMZ south at least into the western highlands of GVN MR 2. Some evidence indicates that it eventually will be extended as far south as the city of Loc Ninh in MR 3. The completion of the new corridor will link up Communist-controlled areas in the western part of the country and, more importantly, will allow the North Vietnamese for the first time to support many of their military units and much of the civilian population under their control via an in-country supply route. Their reliance on the Ho Chi Minh Trail system in Laos and Cambodia will be correspondingly reduced.

17. The augmentation of forces in South Vietnam has been accompanied by a concomitant drawdown in

Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

South Vietnam

Regular Combat Forces

VC/NVA ¹	RVNAF ²	VC/NVA	RVNAF
172,000	287,000	83,000	85,000
		325th	VNMC
		324B	Airborne
		320B	1st
		312th ³	2nd
		304th	3rd
		711th	Regional Forces
		2nd	

1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.

2. Revised RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes present for duty personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions.


3. The headquarters and divisional support units are currently located deep within North Vietnam.

MR 3

VC/NVA	RVNAF
32,000	67,000
429th Sapper Command	25th
9th	18th
7th	5th
5th	Regional Forces

MR 4

VC/NVA	RVNAF
28,000	78,000
1st	21st
	9th
	7th
	44th Special Tactical Zone
	Regional Forces



Communist strength in southern Laos and Cambodia. The estimated total strength of North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in all Laos has been reduced by some 21,000 men since the 22 February Laos ceasefire. The current total strength is 97,000 troops, of which 59,000 are combat personnel and 38,000 are administrative services personnel. North Vietnamese troops account for some 65 percent of the total, or 63,000 men. In southern Laos alone, despite the major reduction in NVA administrative service troops, the North Vietnamese still have some 20,000 support personnel. With the current upgrading of the road system in this area, the North Vietnamese will retain a substantial capability--particularly in a ceasefire environment--to infiltrate supplies and personnel through Laos this coming dry season, even if none of the units which went to South Vietnam return.

18. In Cambodia, there has been a total 15,000-man reduction in VC and NVA forces since 27 January, resulting from units shifting back into South Vietnam. Currently, we estimate that VC and NVA forces in Cambodia total 21,000 men, of which 3,000 are combat and 18,000 are administrative services. North Vietnamese troops number about 17,000 men, or 80 percent of the total.

B. Communists Rebuild Dong Ha Area of South Vietnam

25X1

19. [] aerial photography indicate that the Communists have made a major effort to rebuild and repopulate the town of Dong Ha in northeastern Quang Tri Province. Natives of the area are reportedly being joined both by refugees from other parts of Quang Tri and by North Vietnamese civilian and military personnel "arriving regularly" by buses traveling down Route 1. There are indications that a fairly large market place has been established in the center of town, where goods are being exchanged for both North and South Vietnamese currencies. Numerous new structures housing Communist administrative and party cadre have apparently been erected in the town, and there are several large

food and POL storage areas on the outskirts. Some of the supplies are probably being shipped from North Vietnam by watercraft, which have been photographed offloading cargo at a recently established port facility on the nearby Cua Viet River. Finally, at the Dong Ha airfield the Communists are reportedly dismantling the pierced steel plating laid down in earlier years by U.S. and GVN forces and using it in the construction of buildings and walkways in the surrounding area.

C. Logistic Developments and Air Operations in Cambodia

20. Last week the Communists continued to move supplies between widely scattered storage areas in Cambodia despite strikes by US aircraft. Unlike on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, overland transport in most parts of enemy-controlled Cambodia during the summer monsoon is possible--although at reduced levels--because of better road conditions. In the north, C-130 gunships destroyed three trucks moving along Route 19 east of Stung Treng on 19 July. U.S. Pilots also reported sighting vehicle traffic last week on Routes 6 and 21 north of Kompong Cham City, and along routes leading between the Chup area and the South Vietnam border. Gunships strafed a group of suspected enemy watercraft on the Mekong River some 15 miles north of Phnom Penh on 13 July, destroying four of the craft and damaging seven.

25X1

[redacted] ralliers report that Communist convoys of boats use this stretch of the Mekong each night to transport supplies purchased in FANK-controlled areas to depots of the insurgents up river at Chhlong and Kratie.

D. Khmer Communist Offensive Has Provided Large Stocks of Captured FANK Military Equipment

21. The recent Khmer Communist offensive along Routes 3 and 4 near Phnom Penh has provided some KC units with substantial stocks of weapons and other war materiel obtained by capture. Communications intercepted from KC units within the last ten days

have indicated that the amount of materiel captured in the last six months has included a wide variety of ordnance and other military hardware. The KC Southwest Region Committee reported in a message of 20 July that it had captured 5,034 weapons of various types (including eight 105-mm howitzers), 1,400 tons of ammunition, and 6 vehicles. Other COMINT reports from units operating near the capital indicate that the Communists have also captured large amounts of equipment in that area. A 17 July message from the Eastern Region Standing Committee outlined the results of a 6 July battle on Route 3 near Kompong Kantout. Two 105-mm weapons, 1,000 various smaller weapons, 15 military vehicles and at least several thousand tons of military equipment and ammunition were recovered, according to the source. Other intercepted messages from the same area have provided similar evidence of the capture of FANK military equipment by Khmer Communist units. Nonetheless, Khmer Communist effectiveness in some areas continues to be hampered by localized shortages of ammunition.

Page Denied

ANNEX B

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North
Vietnamese Personnel to the South

1. An additional regular infiltration Group--1061--which was detected in an 11 July intercepted message, has now been accepted as a new group. The message, which originated from Binh Tram 18 in Vinh, North Vietnam, made reference to a Group 1061 with 55 people, but at the time of its detection, the group was believed to consist of stragglers from an earlier Group 1061, which was observed in North Vietnam on 25 February. As a result of the appearance last week Groups 1042, 1060, and 1085, however, Group 1061 now is believed to be a new combat infiltration group which is destined for VC MR 5. Because messages describing regular combat groups initially detected at BT 18 have sometimes referred to only a portion of the group, CIA is adding Group 1061 to its infiltration totals at an estimated strength of 500 troops--the average for regular combat groups. DIA is carrying the group in its estimates at the detected strength of 55 men.

2. In addition to the acceptance of this combat group, three special-purpose groups were added to our estimate during the reporting period. These groups, which have a total estimated strength of about 75 civilian and military specialists, were detected in southern Laos and South Vietnam. Table 1, below, shows overall infiltration starts from North Vietnam for the past two infiltration seasons, while Table 2 summarizes the pattern of starts since 1 January 1973.

Table 1

INFILTRATION STARTS: COMBAT TROOPS LEAVING
NORTH VIETNAM FOR THE SOUTH*1972-1973
Infiltration Year**

Total Infiltration	94,000
Starts 1 September	
1972 through 30	
June 1973	
(broken down by area	
of destination)	
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	33,000 (CIA) , 36,000 (DOD)
MR 5	9,000
B-3 Front	14,000 (CIA) , 11,000 (DOD)
COSVN	26,000
Southern Laos	
and MR 559	12,000
Total Infiltration	2,200 (CIA) , 1,800 (DOD)
Starts From 1	
Through 23 July	
(broken down by area	
of destination)	
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	0
MR 5	2,200 (CIA) , 1,800 (DOD)
B-3 Front	0
COSVN	0
Southern Laos	
and MR 559	0

* This Table includes only combat infiltration groups, and omits special purpose groups. There are minor differences between the DOD and the CIA on the number of personnel destined for specific areas listed on this table. Where such differences exist, both the CIA and the DOD estimates are given.

** For accounting purposes, we arbitrarily define the "infiltration year" as beginning on 1 September, which roughly coincides with the start of the dry season along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Laos Panhandle each year.

TABLE 2

Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973

	<u>Total</u> ^{1/}	<u>Special-Purpose</u> ^{2/}
January	20,000	1,600
February	10,200	2,100
March	3,250	2,250
April	1,925	1,200
May	7,175	300
1-15 June	825	325
16-22 June	425	175
23-27 June	450	200
30- 6 July	600	100
7-13 July	800 (DIA) 1,225 (CIA)	75
14-17 July	1,050	0
18-23 July	75	75

1/ Including gap-filled groups, except Groups 7001-7009 and 5057. Assuming that these groups departed after 1 January, about 5,000 combat troops would be added to the infiltration starts shown above.

2/ Including those groups which were initially detected without a specific strength but which have been assigned an average strength of 35.

25X1

Secret



Secret